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1Abstract
The “decoupled” liability system awards the plaintiﬀ an amount that diﬀers
from what the defendant pays. The previous approach to the optimal de-
coupling design is based on the assumption of complete information, which
results in an optimal liability for the defendant “as much as he can aﬀord.”
This extreme conclusion may hinder the acceptability of the decoupling sys-
tem. This paper proposes an alternative design based on the assumption
that agents in the post-accident subgame have asymmetric information. Our
model indicates that the optimal penalty faced by the defendant is generally
greater than the optimal award to the plaintiﬀ. When the potential harm
is suﬃciently large, the optimal penalty can be approximated by a multiple
of the harm, but the plaintiﬀ receives only a ﬁnite amount of the damages
regardless of the loss suﬀered. Such a decoupling scheme deters frivolous
lawsuits without reducing the defendants’ incentives to exercise care. Addi-
tionally, this paper derives comparative static results concerning how the trial
costs of the plaintiﬀ and defendant aﬀect the optimal design of decoupling.
21 Introduction
In their seminal paper in this Journal, Polinsky and Che (1991) demonstrate
the eﬃciency of a “decoupled” liability regime. In that system, the plaintiﬀ
is awarded an amount diﬀerent from (and usually smaller than) what the
defendant pays.1 The original idea of decoupling liability was proposed by
Schwartz (1980) and Salop and White (1986), and was partly motivated to
reduce excessive liability, mainly due to punitive damages, faced by busi-
nesses. By reducing the portion received by the plaintiﬀ without increasing
the payment by the defendant, the latter’s expected excessive liability may
be reduced.2 The contribution by Polinsky and Che demonstrates that a
properly employed decoupling regime can preserve the incentive for (poten-
tial) injurers to maintain care while reducing the legal costs of lawsuits, and
hence improve eﬃciency.
A key observation of Polinsky and Che’s argument is that the injurer’s
optimal level of care is an increasing function of both the award to the plaintiﬀ
(Wp) and the payment by the defendant (Wd). This is the case because
both Wp and Wd contribute to the injurer’s expected cost of an accident,
and therefore increase the incentive to exercise care. As such, starting from
any coupled damages, one can raise Wd and reduce Wp at the same time,
rendering the eﬀect of holding the injurer’s level of care unchanged while
reducing the plaintiﬀ’s incentive to pursue the legal process, and thereby
reducing the litigation costs on both sides.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal decoupling design
by taking into account the eﬀects of pretrial negotiation. As pointed out by
1In practice the diﬀerence is collected by the government.
2See Sharkey (2003) pp. 375-380 for an extensive review on legislative rationale for
various split-recovery statutes introduced in mid-1980s. These statutes represent a spe-
cial form of decoupling, as they require the plaintiﬀs to split punitive damages with the
government funds.
3Nalebuﬀ (1987), a key feature of the suit-settlement process is the information
asymmetry between the litigating parties. The lack of common knowledge
regarding a dispute’s prospects in court often causes the failure of pretrial
negotiation, and leads to jury trials that involve higher costs.3 In other
words, asymmetric information plays a crucial role in the litigating parties’
strategic interaction in both the settlement-phase and the trial-phase.
The credibility of the plaintiﬀ’s threat of litigation is a central issue when
considering asymmetric information. Nalebuﬀ (1987) showed that a weaker
plaintiﬀ might actually demand a higher settlement in order to limit the bad
news conveyed by the defendant’s rejection of an oﬀer. When applying this
result to Polinsky and Che’s model, we ﬁnd a contradictory implication. In
the context of decoupled liability, a plaintiﬀ is considered weak if the award in
court is set at a low level. In that event, if the plaintiﬀ is further undermined
by an even lower award, her response is likely to act more aggressively due
to the credibility constraint. In other words, reducing the award may lead to
a higher probability of litigation and a higher level of care from the injurer.
Thus, the original argument of Polinsky and Che that an increase in the
penalty matched with a decrease in the award improves eﬃciency is only
valid when the plaintiﬀ is not bound by the credibility concern. Accordingly,
the proposed scheme that makes the defendant pay as much as he can aﬀord
is no longer optimal.
In light of this problem, our model provides a complete solution to the
post-accident suit-settlement negotiation and reaches an eﬃcient decoupling
design without encouraging frivolous lawsuits or diminishing the exercise
of care. That is, in our optimal system, the payment by the defendant
is generally greater than the award to the plaintiﬀ. This conclusion is in
3Without asymmetric information, as Rubinstein (1985) showed, all bargaining is ex-
pected to be settled immediately, and there should be no trials at all. This, of course, is
inconsistent with the emphasis of trial costs in the decoupling literature.
4sharp contrast with the literature such as with Polinsky and Che (1991) and
Choi and Sanchirico (2004), in which the relative magnitude of penalty and
award is ambiguous. We further show that the defendant’s penalty can be
approximated by a multiple of the harm caused. This result complements the
“multiplier” theory proposed by Polinsky and Shavell (1998).4 The amount
received by the plaintiﬀ, however, is strictly bounded and does not grow
with the harm suﬀered. Such a decoupling scheme deters frivolous lawsuits
without reducing the injurers’ incentives to exercise care.
We also show that one of the goals in designing a decoupling system is
to balance the litigating parties’ bargaining positions in pretrial negotiation.
That is, for a weak plaintiﬀ who incurs high cost in trial, she needs to be
motivated by a higher award. The extra incentive comes at the price of more
lawsuits, but the injurer will be more careful. On the other hand, in the
case where the plaintiﬀ is strong and litigious, it is important to discourage
her with a lower award in court, even though it comes at the cost that the
injurer will be less careful.
There have been some eﬀorts in the literature attempting to modify the
decoupling analysis. Kahan and Tuckman (1995) argue that both the de-
fendant and the plaintiﬀ devote eﬀort into the suit-settlement process. A
decoupling causes changes in the optimal eﬀort of both parties, which in
turn yields some ambiguity in the results. Following the same approach, but
fully taking into account the eﬀects on litigation eﬀort, Choi and Sanchirico
(2004) showed that raising damages and lowering the award might not im-
prove eﬃciency. They also show that, when the harm is large, the optimal
4These authors suggest a multiplier approach to calculate the amount of punitive dam-
ages: “the proper level of total damages ... is the harm caused multiplied by the reciprocal
of the probability of being found liable.” See Polinsky and Shavell (1998), p. 874. As we
will show later, the multiplier in our model is higher than what they suggest due to the
fact that the opportunity of settlement reduces the defendant’s expected liability.
5award is greater than the optimal damages, which is opposite to our conclu-
sion. Lewis and Sappington (1999) studied another dimension of decoupling
and showed that it is sometimes desirable to design a liability scheme where
the defendant faces no penalty at all if the harm is small, and a very large
penalty when the harm is suﬃciently large. They showed that under some
conditions a decoupling like this might be more eﬃcient than a usual cou-
pled one. Daughety and Reinganum (2003) analyzed a special version of
decoupling that allows the state to share the punitive damages award. They
considered a settlement bargaining model with asymmetric information, and
showed that the split-award statutes leads to more frequent settlements at
lower amounts. None of these articles fully characterizes the optimal decou-
pling system under the asymmetric information framework.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. The next section
introduces the basic model on which our analysis will be based. Section 3
characterizes the complete solution to our model, and shows the conditions
that can validate the conventional results. In Section 4, we explicitly derive
the optimal decoupling scheme and compare our results with the literature.
Section 5 considers variations of our basic model and shows that the main
conclusion is robust with respect to these extensions. The ﬁnal section con-
cludes.
2 The Model
Consider a model of accident and litigation similar to the one in Polinsky
and Che (1991), except the information asymmetry we shall introduce later.
The potential injurer and victim are both risk neutral. The injurer chooses a
level of care that aﬀects the probability of an accident. If an accident occurs,
a victim is harmed, and the size of the damage is common for all victims.
When a lawsuit is ﬁled after the accident, the probability that the victim
6will prevail is q, depending on how the evidence is preserved and presented.
If the victim prevails, the defendant makes a payment to the authority, and
an award is given to the plaintiﬀ. The following notations are adapted from
Polinsky and Che (1991) and Nalebuﬀ (1987).
c = potential injurer’s level of care;
p(c) = probability of an accident (p
0 < 0;p
00 > 0);
` = loss if an accident occurs;
Wp = award to the plaintiﬀ;
Wd = payment by the defendant:
The fact that Wp and Wd can be diﬀerent characterizes the system of decou-
pled liability.
Before a contingent trial, the plaintiﬀ and the defendant may negotiate
to see if a settlement can be reached. We assume that the settlement costs
for the plaintiﬀ and the defendant are negligible, and that the costs of trial
for both sides are respectively
Cp = potential victim’s (plaintiﬀ’s) trial cost;
Cd = potential injurer’s (defendant’s) trial cost:
The innovation of this paper lies in the introduction of asymmetric in-
formation between the litigating parties as follows. Before the accident, the
parameter of liability, q, is supposed to be drawn from a distribution F(q),
which is common knowledge. When an accident occurs, the defendant learns
the true q by inspecting the evidence left behind, whereas the plaintiﬀ still
knows only the distribution of q. The settlement/litigation game after an ac-
cident evolves like the one in Nalebuﬀ (1987). Speciﬁcally, the plaintiﬀ will
ﬁrst make a take-it-or-leave-it settlement oﬀer, S. If the defendant accepts
S, he pays S and the plaintiﬀ receives S.5 If the defendant turns down S, the
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Figure 1: The game tree
plaintiﬀ must decide whether to bring the case to court. The trial in court
can reveal the true q, while both parties have to bear litigation costs. Given
a decoupled liability regime, the payoﬀs following a trial would be qWp Cp
for the plaintiﬀ and qWdCd for the defendant. The game tree in Figure 1
illustrates how the game proceeds.
In the subgame following an accident, the plaintiﬀ’s strategy can be sum-
marized by (S;(S)), where S is the settlement demand and (S) is the
conditional probability of litigation if S is rejected. In response to (S;(S)),
the defendant shall adopt a “cut-oﬀ” strategy as shown in Nalebuﬀ (1987): if
the realized q is lower than a cut-oﬀ point q(S), the defendant has a relatively
good case so that he should reject S; if q is higher than q(S), the defendant
is better oﬀ settling.
Anticipating the outcome in the aforementioned subgame, the potential
injurer selects a care level c that minimizes his aggregate expected costs. The
injurer’s costs include the cost to take precaution and the expected costs of
accidents. Without loss of generality, we assume that the cost to implement
c is simply c. When an accident occurs, the injurer expects to settle the
case out of court with probability 1  F(q(S)), while he will be sued with
probability (S)F(q(S)). Thus, the injurer’s problem is to choose c so as to
8minimize
c + p(c) 
 











Let c denote the solution that minimizes (1). Since the settlement oﬀer in
equilibrium (S) depends on the decoupling rates (Wp;Wd), the optimal care
level c is also a function of (Wp;Wd). The social problem is thus to ﬁnd the
optimal decoupling rates that minimize the sum of the injurer’s cost of care,





)  (` + (S
)F(q(S
))(Cp + Cd)): (2)
The following section derives the complete solution to the settlement
game. Readers who are not interested in the bargaining analysis can move
to Proposition 3 directly.
3 The Settlement Subgame
A settlement subgame is one that follows an accident in Figure 1. In the
subgame, both parties are aware of the decoupled liability (Wp;Wd) as well
as the care level c. In this section, we will solve for the settlement subgame
equilibrium for every possible (Wp;Wd).6 To avoid the algebraic complication
of carrying higher-order diﬀerentiations of F() in our later analysis, we shall
assume that the prior of q is uniformly distributed in [0;b] with b  1, so
that F(q) = q=b.
Recall that q(S) represents the defendant’s cut-oﬀ strategy: given an
oﬀer S, the defendant refuses to settle if and only if q  q(S). The following
deﬁnition provides an important benchmark for q(S) in characterizing the
equilibrium.
6Since c does not aﬀect the settlement/litigation payoﬀs, the subgame equilibrium is
solely determined by the decoupled liability.
9Deﬁnition 1. Let q0 be the critical value such that the plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent








With F(q) = q=b, q0 is well-deﬁned and equal to 2Cp=Wp if and only if
2Cp=Wp  b. In the terminology of Nalebuﬀ (1987), the plaintiﬀ’s case has
merit if this inequality holds. When the plaintiﬀ’s case has no merit, the
equilibrium in the settlement subgame is trivial, as suggested in the following
proposition. It shows that the plaintiﬀ will never sue if her reward from
winning the case in court is too low. Further, the plaintiﬀ cannot extract
any payment from settlement since her threat to litigate is not credible.
Proposition 1. Suppose Wp < 2Cp=b. Then in any subgame perfect equilib-
rium, the defendant never accepts settlement oﬀers (q(S) = b;8S > 0), while
the plaintiﬀ never goes to court ((S) = 0;8S > 0).
Now we consider the scenario when the case has merit. We start with the
subgame in the last stage, and solve for the equilibrium strategies backwards.
Suppose a settlement oﬀer S is rejected by the defendant, whose cut-oﬀ
strategy is q(S). The plaintiﬀ must determine whether to bring the case to
court. The following decision rules characterize the plaintiﬀ’s best response
to q(S): (i) if q(S) < q0, the plaintiﬀ’s expected payoﬀ of litigation is negative,
and thus (S) = 0; (ii) if q(S) > q0, the expected payoﬀ of litigation is
positive, and thus (S) = 1; (iii) if q(S) = q0, the plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent
whether to litigate so that (S) 2 [0;1].
Next, consider the subgame where the defendant is presented with a set-
tlement oﬀer. Suppose the plaintiﬀ adopts the strategy (S;(S)). The best







Note that q > q(S) implies S < (S)(qWd+Cd). Therefore, the defendant is
indeed better oﬀ accepting S if his realized q is greater than the cut-oﬀ value
q(S). Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium strategies in the subgame
after the plaintiﬀ has made a settlement oﬀer S.
Proposition 2 (Nalebuﬀ (1987)). Assuming Wp > 2Cp=b, for any settle-















if S < q0Wd + Cd:
(4)
Denote the threshold in (4) by S0  q0Wd + Cd. The proposition states
that the plaintiﬀ will go to court with probability one if the settlement oﬀer
is high enough (S  S0). In other words, a high settlement demand enables
the plaintiﬀ to “limit the bad news”: the corresponding q(S) from (3) will be
high so that she still has a good case in court when S is rejected. Meanwhile,
when the plaintiﬀ proposes an oﬀer below S0, her threat of going to court
is no longer credible.8 Instead, the plaintiﬀ has to reduce (S) as well to
maintain q(S) = q0 for S < S0. The limitation placed by the credibility
consideration proves to be crucial in the settlement subgame, as shown in
Nalebuﬀ (1987).
7The defendant with q = q(S) is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting S. As long
as the distribution of q is non-atomic, the strategy for the type q(S) does not aﬀect our
analysis.
8Otherwise, (S) = 1 and S < S0 imply q(S) < q0 according to (3), which in turn
implies (S) = 0, a contradiction.
11When the settlement oﬀer is even lower (S  Cd), there exist multiple
equilibria in the continuation subgame. Besides (q0; S
q0Wd+Cd) as prescribed in
Proposition 2, (q(S);(S)) = (0;1) also constitutes an equilibrium. In the
latter equilibrium, the defendant always agrees to settle because S is very
low. If the defendant were to reject S, he believes that the plaintiﬀ will sue
with probability one, which is a credible threat provided Wp > 2Cp=b. For the
convenience of exposition, we select (q(S);(S)) = (0;1) as the equilibrium
for S  Cd. The selection is irrelevant because S  Cd will never emerge in
the optimal decoupling, assuming that ` is large enough.
Foreseeing the equilibrium response (q(S);(S)) that follows a settlement
oﬀer S, the plaintiﬀ can derive her expected payoﬀ V (S) of proposing S.
The following formula deﬁnes V (S), which is comparable to the defendant’s
expected cost for an accident (cf. (1)), except that both parties bear their
own litigation costs, and the liabilities are decoupled.
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if S0 < S < ¯ S;
Cp +
bWp
2 if S  ¯ S;
(6)
where ¯ S  bWd + Cd. For S  Cd, one obtains V (S) = S by substituting
the selected equilibrium, (q(S);(S)) = (0;1), into (5). For the other three
cases, the equilibrium is unique from Proposition 2, and we simply apply
(4) to derive V (S). For Cd < S  S0, q(S) = q0 and thus the net payoﬀ
of a lawsuit is zero by deﬁnition of q0. V (S) in this case reﬂects only the
12settlement income. In contrast, for S  ¯ S in the last case, q(S)  b, which
means that no defendant will accept such a high settlement oﬀer. V (S) here
reﬂects only the net payoﬀ from litigation. Finally, for S0 < S < ¯ S, q(S)
lies between q0 and b. The plaintiﬀ derives her expected payoﬀ from both
settlement and litigation.
Note that the value function V (S) is continuous except when S is equal
to Cd. In addition to the jump at Cd, V (S) also has two kinks at S = S0 and
¯ S. The ﬁrst kink is due to the credibility constraint: when S drops below
S0, the threat that (S) = 1 is no longer credible. As for the second kink,
V (S) is constant for S  ¯ S because no defendant will agree to a settlement
demand higher than ¯ S.
Provided (6), the plaintiﬀ’s optimization problem in the settlement sub-
game is to select an optimal settlement demand S to maximize V (S). Let
b V (S) denote the unconstrained value function (i.e., the segment of V (S) for
S 2 (S0; ¯ S)).

















The following deﬁnition will be useful in characterizing S.
Deﬁnition 2. b S solves the equation db V (S)=dS = 0 while b q 
b SCd
Wd .
In other words, b S maximizes V (S) if the credibility constraint is not bind-
ing and the second order condition holds. For uniformly distributed q, one
obtains b q =
bWdCpCd
2WdWp .
From the above discussion, we know that the optimal S must be either
b S or one of the corner solutions (Cd, S0, or, ¯ S). Which of these solutions
maximizes V (S) depends on the decoupled liability (Wp;Wd). Proposition 3
shows that one can partition the set, !  f(Wp;Wd) : Wp > 2Cp=b; Wd > 0g,
into four subsets such that each subset associates with a certain solution for
S.9









!iii : S = Cd
2(Cp+Cd)
b









Wp = Wd +
Cp+Cd
b





!iv : S = S0
qq q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q
q q q q q q q q q q q q





!v : plaintiﬀ’s case has no merit
Figure 2: Optimal settlement demand S
Proposition 3. Assuming Wp > 2Cp=b, the optimal settlement demand S
as a function of (Wp;Wd) is given by b S, ¯ S, Cd, or S0 if (Wp;Wd) 2 !i, !ii,
!iii, or !iv, respectively, where the regions !i !iv are as depicted in Figure
2.
Proof. See Appendix.




Wp = 1 is a ﬂat line as
shown in the diagram if Cd = Cp. It will be increasing (decreasing) and
concave (convex) if Cd < Cp (Cd > Cp).10
10On the boundaries between !0s, the plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent between various choices
of S. For instance, when Wp =
2(Cp+Cd)
b and Wd 
Cp+Cd
b , the plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent
between proposing Cd or ¯ S. One can verify that b S = ¯ S for (Wp;Wd) 2 !i\!ii and b S = S0
for (Wp;Wd) 2 !i \!iv. Therefore, S(Wp;Wd) as stated in Proposition 3 coincides along
these two boundaries. However, ¯ S can never be equal to Cd (b cannot be zero), and thus
S is discontinuous on the border between !ii and !iii. Likewise, S0 can never be equal to
Cd (q0 cannot be zero), and thus S is also discontinuous on the border between !iii and
14Propositions 1 and 3 characterize the settlement subgame equilibria for
Wp < 2Cp=b and Wp > 2Cp=b, respectively. With similar arguments, one can
show that all of the subgame equilibria in Propositions 1 and 2 remain to
be equilibrium in the scenario with Wp = 2Cp=b. As we will show later, the
equilibria that associate with Wp = 2Cp=b will never emerge in the optimal
decoupling, assuming a suﬃciently large `. Therefore, how we select the
equilibrium is irrelevant to our analysis.
4 The Optimal Decoupling
The previous section characterizes the optimal settlement demand S for
any given decoupling rates, (Wp;Wd). Accordingly, the injurer derives his

















Before any accident occurs, the potential injurer chooses a care level c to
minimize his aggregate expected costs, c + p(c)  EPA. In view of (1), one
obtains the optimal c by solving the ﬁrst order condition as follows.
1 + p
0(c)  EPA = 0: (8)
The regularity assumptions of p0(c) < 0 and p00(c) > 0 assure that a solution
to (8) indeed minimizes the injurer’s aggregate expected costs. In addition,
they imply that an increase in EPA induces a higher care level by the poten-
tial injurer.11 Let c(Wp;Wd) denote the solution to (8). The social problem
!iv. For convenience of exposition, we deﬁne !iii such that it is disjoint with the other
three subsets. Assuming a suﬃciently large `, the way we select S along these boundaries
does not aﬀect our analysis because they never emerge as the optimal decoupling.
11That is, dc=dEPA = p0(c)2=p00(c) > 0.













As we have shown in the last section, !0s divide the liability space into
various regions, each of which corresponds with a particular solution of S.
By analyzing the optimization program in (9) separately for each region,
one concludes that a necessary condition for a liability system to achieve
eﬃciency is (Wp;Wd) 2 !i \ !iv. We brieﬂy discuss the properties of these
regions. The details can be found in Appendix.
 In !i, the credibility constraint is not binding, and thus the interior
solution is feasible so that S = b S. Proposition 4 below shows that
Polinsky and Che (1991)’s argument still applies in this region. It
follows that any interior point in !i cannot be eﬃcient (Lemma 2).
 In !ii, the award Wp is very high comparing to the penalty Wd. Con-
sequently, both parties prefer to resolve the case in court instead of
settlement. Lemma 1 shows that to decouple liabilities in this way can
never be optimal.
 In !iii, the award is so low that the plaintiﬀ would rather settle the
case out of court with S = Cd. As we argue in Lemma 4, when the
harm caused is suﬃciently large, this type of decoupled liability cannot
be eﬃcient since it does not provide enough incentive for the injurer to
take adequate precautions.
 In !iv, the credibility constraint is binding, and S = S0. Proposition 4
shows that one can adapt Polinsky and Che (1991)’s argument by rais-
ing both Wd and Wp to enhance eﬃciency. Therefore, any interior point
in !iv cannot be eﬃcient (Lemma 2).
16 Finally, the plaintiﬀ’s case is meritless in !v. One can verify that mak-
ing the case meritless cannot be eﬃcient, provided ` > Cd (Lemma 3).
The reason is similar to that for the scenario !iii: the injurer has no
incentive to be careful when causing an accident has no consequence.
Before we proceeds with solving the optimization program in (9), we
shall ﬁrst explain why the argument and solution proposed in Polinsky and
Che (1991) are diﬀerent when there is asymmetric information concerning q.
Polinsky and Che (1991) argue that the social planner can improve eﬃciency
of the coupled liability system by raising Wd and reducing Wp at the same
time. On the one hand, raising Wd increases the injurer’s expected costs
when an accident occurs, and thus encourages him to be more careful. On
the other hand, reducing Wp decreases the victim’s return from litigation and
hence her incentive to sue, which in turn induces less care from the injurer. If
one adjusts Wd and Wp in such a way that the injurer’s level of care remains
the same, the cost of care is not aﬀected but the litigation costs can be saved,
which results in lower social cost.
The following proposition shows that the scheme proposed by Polinsky
and Che improves eﬃciency only when the credibility constraint is not bind-
ing. If the credibility constraint is binding, one could reduce the social cost
with an alternative scheme that raises both Wd and Wd.
Proposition 4. For any (Wp;Wd) in !i n !iv, there exist 4p;4d > 0 such
that the new decoupled liability (Wp4p;Wd+4d) is more eﬃcient with the
same level of care but fewer lawsuits. In contrast, the eﬃciency-improving
scheme takes a diﬀerent form when starting from !iv: 8 (Wp;Wd) 2 !iv n!i;
94p;4d > 0 such that (Wp + 4p;Wd + 4d) implements the same level of
care with fewer lawsuits.
Proof. See Appendix.
17Proposition 4 indicates that raising Wd and lowering Wp indeed reduce
the social cost if we start from (Wp;Wd) 2 !i. However, when Wd and Wp
keep moving in the prescribed directions, they eventually reach the quadrant





negative in this subset, and thus further reducing Wp does not render the
desired eﬀects suggested by Polinsky and Che (1991).
The next proposition shows that an alternative system is more eﬃcient
as long as the accident loss ` is suﬃciently large. Before proceeding, we need
to introduce the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1. (1  p(c)) is a probability distribution function. That is,
p(0) = 1 and limc!1 p(c) = 0.
Assumption 2. The ratio,
p0(c)
p(c) , is an increasing function of c.
p0(c)
p(c) can be interpreted as the hazard rate when Assumption 1 holds.
Note that the corresponding density function is p0(c) so that the usual
deﬁnition of hazard rate applies.
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. There exists ` such that




































The ﬁrst constraint that determines q is equivalent to the condition that
(Wp;Wd) 2 !i \ !iv.12 Recall that the plaintiﬀ’s credibility constraint is











18binding in !iv, and non-binding in !i. Proposition 5 shows that for any de-
coupled liability to be eﬃcient, the credibility constraint must be marginally
binding, provided ` large enough.
The solution to (10) depends on the functional form of p(c) as well as
other parameters like `, Cp, or Cd. In general, it is diﬃcult to derive the
closed-form solution to the decoupling problem. Nonetheless, the optimal
decoupled liability takes a very simple form when Cp = Cd.










By further assuming that p(c) = exp(c), one obtains `  2:146  Cd. In
other words, the decoupling system that solves (10) is the most eﬃcient one
if and only if ` > 2:146  Cd.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the example, we ﬁnd that the optimal award to the plaintiﬀ is indepen-
dent of the loss suﬀered. In contrast, the optimal payment by the defendant
is greater than and proportional to `. The following corollaries generalize
these properties.











The upper and lower bounds of the interval are independent of `.
Proof. The corollary follows from the observation that the path of !i \ !iv
is bounded between Wp =
2(Cp+Cd)
b and the asymptotic line, Wp =
4Cp
b .
19An important policy implication from Corollary 6 is that the court should
abstain from awarding the plaintiﬀ excessive damages. Even though a higher
Wp may impel the defendant to be more careful, the beneﬁt is outweighed
by the increase of wasteful lawsuits.
Corollary 7. Suppose Assumption 2 holds. There exists `
0 such that for
` > `
0, the optimal Wd has a lower bound. In particular, Wd > 2`
b if Cd < Cp,
while Wd >
8(`Cd)
3b if Cd > Cp.
Proof. See Appendix.
Combining the above characterizations of the optimal decoupling rates,
one concludes that, when the harm caused is suﬃciently large,13 the optimal
penalty is greater than the optimal award since the latter is bounded while
the former grows with the harm caused.
Corollary 7 implies that sometimes the court should impose punitive dam-
ages in addition to compensatory damages (Wd > `).14 Moreover, the mag-
nitude of the total damages should be aligned with ` to achieve the optimal
deterrence. In fact, the following equation provides a simple formula to de-











Wd + Cd; (12)
where q = b
2.15 This result complements the multiplier theory proposed by
Polinsky and Shavell (1998).16 Assuming uniform distribution, the multiplier
13In Example 1, for instance, the inequality 4Cd
b < 8`
3b holds whenever ` > `. Thus, the
requirement that the harm caused be suﬃciently large is not too stringent.
14Recall that b  1. See the ﬁrst paragraph in section 3.
15Recall that the injurer solves 1 + p0(c)  EPA = 0 to obtain c, where EPA is given




to zero. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition to (10) reduces to 1+p0(c)(`+
q

b (Cp+Cd)) = 0
(cf. (A3)). One obtains (12) by comparing these two conditions.
16See footnote 4.
20granted by their formula is 2, which is “the reciprocal of the probability of
being found liable.” In contrast, the multiplier obtained from (12) is 8
3. The
discrepancy is due to the fact that the opportunity of settlement reduces the
defendant’s expected liability.17
The path of !i \ !iv in Figure 2 depicts the necessary condition that
regulates the optimal decoupling rates. For Cp > Cd, one observes that
an increase in Wd leads to a higher Wp and fewer lawsuits (i.e., !i \ !iv
has a positive slope). The intuition is that, with Cp > Cd, it is relatively
more diﬃcult for the plaintiﬀ to establish credibility to sue. The concern
of credibility forces the plaintiﬀ to litigate excessively. Raising Wd improves
the plaintiﬀ’s bargaining position and alleviates her credibility problem. As
a result, the plaintiﬀ does not need to litigate as much as before. Conversely,
for Cp < Cd, a higher Wd associates with a lower Wp and more lawsuits
(!i \ !iv has a negative slope). The reason is that the plaintiﬀ here is too
conﬁdent about her case in court due to her relatively low trial cost. Raising
Wd will only encourage her to act even more aggressively and hurt the chance
of settlement.
The previous discussion addresses the marginal eﬀects of Wd on settlement
rates. Essentially, it depends on whether the plaintiﬀ is “conﬁdent” about
her case: she is conﬁdent in court when Cp < Cd. The same condition
plays a signiﬁcant role in characterizing the global properties of the optimal
decoupling system, as we will show in the next corollary.
Corollary 8. Suppose ` > `. The inequality Cp < Cd implies that the
settlement rate in equilibrium is higher than 1
2, and that the care level is
lower than the socially optimal level.
Proof. See Appendix.
17Without possibility of settlement, the expected cost of an accident (EPA) for the
injurer is equal to b
2Wd + Cd, which is greater than the right hand side of (12).
21The ﬁrst assertion indicates that a relatively stronger plaintiﬀ (in terms of
trial costs) acts less aggressively and settle the case more often. The second
assertion characterizes the response from the defendant: when defending
against a less aggressive plaintiﬀ, the injurer tends not to be motivated to
take adequate precautions.
5 Extension and Discussion
5.1 Comparative statics
This section studies the properties of the optimal decoupling system, assum-
ing the accident loss ` is suﬃciently large so that Proposition 5 applies. We
will show that, with a small increase of `, the social planner should impose
a higher penalty payable by the defendant, that the injurer will be more
careful, and that the victim will make a higher settlement demand when
an accident occurs. Nonetheless, the impact on the amount awarded to the
victim and the chance of settlement depends on which party incurs a higher
litigation cost.
Proposition 9. Assuming ` > `, a small increase in ` leads to an increase
in the defendant’s liability Wd, a higher care level, and a higher settlement
demand. It also leads to an increase in the plaintiﬀ’s award Wp, and a higher
probability of settlement if and only if Cd < Cp.
Proof. See Appendix.
The social costs comprise cost of care and expected costs of accidents.
When the damage caused by an accident is higher, the second type of cost
outweighs the ﬁrst. From the society’s point of view, the chance of accident
needs to be lower to return to balance. In order to make sure that the
22potential injurer exercises extra care that reduces p(c), the social planner
shall raise Wd, which leads to a higher EPA and a higher level of care.
The impact of a higher ` on Wp and q is not as straightforward. Even
though an increase in q assures a higher level of care (see equation (A2)),
it also results in more litigation and thus higher trial costs. The tradeoﬀ
between the chance and the costs of an accident is balanced according to
(10) so that the plaintiﬀ’s credibility constraint is marginally binding.
It is important to note that changes in ` do not alter the diagram in
Figure 2. Therefore, the new optimal decoupling rates due to a higher ` must
stay at the same trajectory of !i \ !iv, and consequently, q is determined
by the same equation as (10). In sum, a small increase in ` leads to a higher
Wd, which determines q through (10).
In conclusion, when the damage from an accident is more severe, the
social planner’s goal is to induce a higher level of care from the injurer. In
addition to raising Wd to let the defendant internalize the damage, the social
planner also needs to encourage a weak plaintiﬀ (with Cp > Cd) to settle by
providing a higher award in court, and urge a strong plaintiﬀ to litigate by
reducing Wp.
5.2 Budget constraint
In their model with complete information, Polinsky and Che (1991) have
argued that the defendant should make the maximum possible payment in the
optimal decoupling. By incorporating their assumption of budget constraint,
we show that their conclusion can emerge in equilibrium as a special case of
our model.
Suppose the defendant’s payment cannot exceed an upper bound, m. The
social problem in this scenario is to ﬁnd a solution to (10), with the additional
constraint that Wd  m. Obviously, if the budget constraint is not binding
23(i.e., the optimal payment that solves (10) is below the upper bound, m), the
optimal decoupling will not be aﬀected by the budget constraint. If, however,
the budget constraint is binding, the optimal decoupling under the constraint
is exactly the system that has been proposed by Polinsky and Che.
Proposition 10. If the budget constraint is binding so that the unconstrained
optimal payment is greater than m, the optimal decoupling with budget con-
straint should make the defendant’s payment as high as possible, i.e., the
optimal payment is equal to m.
The argument follows from Proposition 4. A decoupling system in !in!iv
can always be improved upon by raising Wd and reducing Wp, while a system
in !iv n !i can be improved upon by raising both Wd and Wp. Without the
budget constraint, the social planner can limit her search for the optimal
decoupling to the boundary, !i \ !iv, as we have shown in Proposition 5.
In the presence of the budget constraint, the social planner must extend her
search to include the vertical line, Wd = m, because the eﬃciency-improving
scheme (by reducing lawsuits while maintaining the care level) may reach
Wd = m ﬁrst before it arrives at !i \ !iv. When the budget constraint is
binding, the social cost is decreasing in Wd along the path of !i \ !iv. In
that case, the optimal Wd is equal to m.
5.3 Endogenous distribution of q
We have assumed that the distribution of q is independent of the injurer’s
eﬀort to take precaution. In this section, we will show that our conclusion is
robust to this assumption.
Suppose the injurer’s liability q follows a uniform distribution over [0;b(c)]
with b0(c) < 0;b00(c) > 0. The upper bound b(c) (and thus the distribution of
q) is ﬁxed after the injurer selects her care level. The subsequent settlement
subgame proceeds exactly as discussed in Section 3.
24A diagram similar to that in Figure 2 illustrates how the plaintiﬀ selects
her optimal settlement demand. As we assume an endogenous distribution
of q, the subsets !0s that characterize S will be determined endogenously
as well. For instance, the plaintiﬀ’s case has merit if Wp >
2Cp
b(0). Term b in
the threshold is given by b(0) because the injurer will not exercise any care
at all when the victim’s case has no merit.
The following numeric example is analogous to Example 1 except that
the distribution of q is endogenous.
Example 2. Suppose Cp = Cd, p(c) = exp(c), and b(c) = exp(c). The














It is interesting to note that in equilibrium the injurer’s care level as well
as the social costs are exactly the same as those in Example 1. However,
we have shown in the proof that under any decoupling system, the injurer is
more motivated to take precautions if it reduces his share of responsibility.
These contradictory facts are only superﬁcial: note that the optimal Wd in
the current example is actually lower than before. In other words, when the
injurer is self-motivated, the social planner does not have to impose severe
punishment in court anymore.
5.4 Negligence rule
In the discussion so far, the parameter q represents the plaintiﬀ’s chance of
winning the lawsuit. Alternatively, q can be interpreted as the defendant’s
share of responsibility in the accident. In the latter interpretation, the court
adopts a simple liability rule in which the defendant is always liable regardless
25of q, and the amount of damages he pays is the predetermined Wd, multiplied
by q. In practice, a certain negligence rule is often in place. In this section,
we shall study the impact of negligence rules on the injurer’s and the victim’s
behaviors, as well as the implication for the social planner’s policy choice.
Consider the original model in Section 2, except that the defendant is not
liable for any damages if his share of responsibility q in the accident is lower
than a threshold, qd. In other words, the defendant is deemed negligent and
pays qWd to the authority if and only if q revealed in court is higher than
the due-care standard, qd. Whatever the court judgment is, both parties pay
their own trial costs.
To solve for the equilibrium of the current settlement subgame, one adapts







The lower bound for the integration has changed from 0 to qd since the
plaintiﬀ loses the case if q < qd due to the negligence rule. Assuming the









higher than before because the plaintiﬀ needs a better case to break even in
court under the new negligence rule. To put it diﬀerently, the threshold of
Wp for the case to have merit is higher than the previous threshold 2Cp=b.
Proposition 1 still applies, with an adapted presumption for meritless
cases.18 Proposition 2 holds as well, with the new q0. Nonetheless, for a
settlement oﬀer lower than Cd, (q(S);(S)) = (0;1) can no longer constitute
an equilibrium. In fact, for any q(S) < q0, the plaintiﬀ will abandon the
case in the last stage. The reason is that some defendants (with q < qd)
will never settle as they are certain that they are not at fault. Therefore, the
threat to litigate is always on the equilibrium path,19 and hence not credible if
18Speciﬁcally, the case does not have merit if Wp < 2bCp=(b2  q2
d).
19In Section 3 without the negligence rule, the threat is oﬀ the path for (q(S);(S)) =
26q(S) < q0. Consequently, there exists a unique equilibrium for S  Cd, which






To determine the optimal settlement demand, the plaintiﬀ maximizes her
expected value V (S) of proposing S:









Once again, the only change in the formulation due to the negligence rule is
the lower bound of the integration.
There are three candidates for S that could maximize V (S): the interior
solution of S = b S and two corner solutions of S = S0 or ¯ S.20 Figure 3 depicts
the partitions of the decoupling-rate space that characterize the equilibria in
the settlement subgame. With analogous argument that leads to Proposi-
tion 5, one can show that a necessary condition for the optimal decoupling
is given by q0 = b q, which characterizes the border between the regions of
S = S0 and S = b S in Figure 3.
The general impact of qd on the equilibrium is ambiguous. Nonetheless,
under the same decoupling rates, we know that the injurer will be less care-
ful for a small increase of qd when qd is close to zero.21 The reason is quite
obvious: the existence of a negligence rule partly relieves the injurer of his
responsibility. At the margin, the negligence rule alters the bargaining posi-
tions in the settlement subgame and favors the defendant. In response, the
plaintiﬀ becomes more litigious, which leads to a higher social cost per acci-
dent. It follows that the social planner should raise Wd when implementing
the negligent rule so that the injurer will be more careful in the new system.
(0;1), since every defendant accepts S with q(S) = 0.
20S = Cd is not eligible as (q(S);(S)) = (0;1) no longer constitutes an equilibrium.
21Speciﬁcally, @EPA
@qd converges to Cd
b as qd approaches zero, and thus dc
dqd < 0 in a
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Figure 3: Optimal settlement demand with a negligence rule
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the optimal system of decoupled liability.
When asymmetric information between injurer and victim is present, the
concern of credibility plays a crucial role in the plaintiﬀ’s pretrial settlement
strategy. In essence, if a plaintiﬀ worries too much about her credibility in
court, she acts too aggressively in the settlement phase. Accordingly, the
injurer makes an excessive eﬀort to prevent an accident from happening in
order to avoid an aggressive victim. Conversely, if a plaintiﬀ is too conﬁdent
about her case, she would rather bring the case to court than settle it. In
either case, there will be too much litigation, leaving the system ineﬃcient.
Thus, the ﬁrst goal in designing a decoupled liability system is to balance
the bargaining positions for those involved in an accident.
The second goal of a liability system is to make sure that the injurer takes
adequate precautions. The tradeoﬀ here is the cost of precautionary eﬀort
and the beneﬁt it creates by reducing the chance of future accidents. When
28there is no asymmetric information, it is easy to verify that Wd = 2(`Cd)=b
implements the ﬁrst-best liability system in which there is no litigation, and
the injurer selects a care level that internalizes future potential harm. The
presence of asymmetric information makes wasteful lawsuits unavoidable.
Otherwise, the injurer will never agree to settle. Consequently, the second-
best care level is distorted upward.
The design proposed by Polinsky and Che (1991) cannot accomplish the
above-mentioned goals when the plaintiﬀ is uninformed about the strength
of her case. With the penalty raised and the award reduced, the plaintiﬀ will
be undermined so that she has to establish her credibility through litigation.
Meanwhile, making the penalty as high as possible forces the injurer to take
excessive care that might be wasteful. Nonetheless, when the defendant in
our model cannot aﬀord the optimal penalty, he should pay as much as he can.
In this scenario, our solution coincides with the optimal system suggested by
Polinsky and Che. That is, our model departs from that of Polinsky and Che
only when the defendant has deep pockets.
Presumably, the plaintiﬀ can be awarded more than what the defendant
pays. Nonetheless, we show that it does not happen in equilibrium. The
assertion is most evident in the limiting case when the harm is suﬃciently
large. In that scenario, we demonstrate that the optimal penalty can be ap-
proximated by a multiple of the actual harm (the multiplier is 8=3, assuming
uniform distribution). In contrast, the optimal award is always conﬁned in
a range independent of the harm suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ.
As we have demonstrated, to achieve the optimal deterrence, one must
balance the litigating parties’ bargaining positions in pretrial negotiation. We
show that a weaker plaintiﬀ needs to be motivated through a higher award
in court, which leads to more lawsuits and higher care level in equilibrium.
Conversely, when the plaintiﬀ is stronger in terms of trial costs, the award
should be set lower, which results in less litigation at the cost that the injurer
29now exerts less care. Similar arguments can be applied to the analysis of
various liability systems. For instance, a negligence rule essentially enhances
the defendant’s bargaining position. When the social planner adjusts the
decoupled liability accordingly, it results in a lower settlement rate, but fewer
accidents.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
The following expressions deﬁne the subsets that correspond with various
S when the case has merit.
!i 
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represent the boundaries of !0s and separate ! into four quadrants. We want
to show that each quadrant associates with a particular S.
30Consider the case with Wp > 2Wd. From (7), b V (S) is a quadratic function
with a positive coeﬃcient on S2. Moreover, b V (S) attains the same value as
V (S) at S = Cd. Therefore, V (S) is maximized at either S = Cd or ¯ S.
Comparing V (Cd) and V (¯ S) implies that Wp =
2(Cp+Cd)
b separates the sets
of fS = ¯ Sg and fS = Cdg.
When Wp = 2Wd, b V (S) is a linear function. The coeﬃcient on S is
positive if and only if Wp >
2(Cp+Cd)
b , in which case S = ¯ S. Otherwise, b V (S)
is decreasing, and S = Cd.
With Wp < 2Wd, b V (S) is a quadratic function with a negative coeﬃcient
on S2. Thus, V (¯ S) is maximal if and only if b S  ¯ S, which is equivalent to
Wp  Wd +
Cp+Cd
b . If the latter inequality does not hold, we must determine
whether the interior solution b S is feasible. If the answer is yes, S = b S;
otherwise, we compare V (S0) against Cd. b S is feasible if and only if b S 




Wp  1. Comparing V (S0) with Cd is
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that the defendant’s expected payment for an accident, when








Wd + Cd; (A2)
where q = b q or q0 for (Wp;Wd) 2 !i or !iv, respectively. EPA determines
the injurer’s care level according to the ﬁrst order condition in (8).
For (Wp;Wd) 2 !i, q = b q 
bWdCpCd
2WdWp . In view of (A2), the set
f(Wp;Wd) : EPA = constant)g deﬁnes an iso-cost curve. It is tedious but
straightforward to verify that the iso-cost curves in !i have negative slope. It
follows that for any (Wp;Wd) 2 !in!iv, there exists 4p;4d > 0 such that the
new decoupled liability (Wp4p;Wd+4d) stays in the region !i and belongs
to the same iso-cost curve as (Wp;Wd). To show that (Wp  4p;Wd + 4d)
31implies a lower q, note that it corresponds with the same EPA as (Wp;Wd).
Since q(1 
q
2b) is an increasing function of q, a higher Wd must associate
with a lower q to keep EPA constant.
For (Wp;Wd) 2 !iv, q = q0 
2Cp
Wp . It is easier to see that the iso-
cost curves in this region have positive slope. The rest of the argument is
analogous to the previous scenario.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof proceeds in four steps. Each step is summarized in a lemma.
The ﬁrst lemma proves that any (Wp;Wd) 2 !ii cannot solve (9). The second
lemma shows that (Wp;Wd) 2 !i [ !iv n !i \ !iv cannot be optimal either.
We further rule out !v  f(Wp;Wd) : Wp  2Cp=b;Wd > 0g in Lemma 3.
Finally, we show that S = Cd is not optimal when ` is suﬃciently large.
First of all, note that the EPA0s associated with S = ¯ S and Cd are both
constants (i.e., independent of (Wp;Wd)), and thus the corresponding social
costs are constants as well.22 Lemma 1 shows that any decoupling rates such
that S(Wp;Wd) = ¯ S cannot be optimal.
Lemma 1. Any decoupled liability in the set, !i \ !ii, can never attain the
minimal social cost.
Proof. From Figure 2, we see that the indicated set, !i\!ii, is the boundary
at which f(Wp;Wd) : S(Wp;Wd) = b S; S(Wp;Wd) = ¯ Sg. Assuming S = b S,
we want to show that the partial derivative of the social cost with respect to
Wp is positive. If the assertion is true, the social planner can lower Wp to
reduce the social cost.
The condition Wp = Wd + (Cp + Cd)=b implies that


















22The EPA0s are Cd + bWd=2 and Cd for S = ¯ S and Cd, respectively. Solving (8)















which completes the proof.
The next lemma shows that in the optimal decoupling system, the plain-
tiﬀ’s credibility constraint must be marginally binding so that q0 = b q.
Lemma 2. For (Wp;Wd) 2 !i[!iv, the necessary condition for (Wp;Wd) to
solve (9) is that (Wp;Wd) 2 !i \ !iv.
Proof. The lemma follows directly from Proposition 4. Essentially, one can
always improve eﬃciency of the decoupling system by maintaining the care
level while reducing the lawsuits, as long as (Wp;Wd) is not on the boundary,
!i \ !iv.
We have been focusing on the scenario of Wp > 2Cp=b in which the
plaintiﬀ’s case has merit. If the plaintiﬀ’s trial reward is so low that Wp <
2Cp=b, there will be no lawsuits at all (see Proposition 1). There is no
settlement either, since the plaintiﬀ’s case has no merit. In this scenario,
the injurer will set his care level at zero. The corresponding social cost is
p(0)  `. In contrast, when S = Cd, the case is always settled out of court.
The corresponding social cost is given by c1+p(c1)` where c1 is the solution
to 1 + p0(c)  Cd = 0. We want to show that the social cost in the latter
scenario is lower than that in the former.
Lemma 3. Suppose Cd < `. Comparing the social costs in the two scenarios
in which there are no lawsuits, one obtains a lower social cost when the case
has merit than that when the case has no merit:
c1 + p(c1)  ` < p(0)  `:
33Proof. Let ˜ c denote the ﬁrst-best level of care that minimizes the social
cost without any lawsuits: ˜ c  argminc c + p(c)  `. ˜ c satisﬁes the ﬁrst order
condition, 1+p0(˜ c)` = 0. Comparing this condition with 1+p0(c1)Cd = 0,
one concludes that c1 < ˜ c, provided Cd < `. Since c + p(c)  ` is a convex
function of c and minimized at ˜ c, the fact that 0 < c1 < ˜ c implies c1+p(c1)` <
p(0)  `.
It is now clear that the social planner must choose between two systems of
decoupled liability. In the ﬁrst option, the social planner selects (Wp;Wd) 2
!iii to implement c1 so that S = Cd, and the parties involved in an accident
always settle the case out of court. The corresponding social cost is c1 +
p(c1)  `. The chance of accidents in this case is higher than desired, but
there is no litigation cost. The second candidate is suggested by Lemma 2,
where (Wp;Wd) 2 !i \!iv so that S = b S = S0. The probability of litigation
in this scenario is positive, but the potential injurer is more careful. The
next lemma shows that the second option is more eﬃcient when the accident
loss ` is suﬃciently large. This completes our proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. There exists ` such that for
` > `, the minimal social cost attained by (Wp;Wd) 2 !i \ !iv is lower than
c1 + p(c1)  `.
Proof. Consider the optimization program in (10). The ﬁrst order condition





















where q and c follows from the constraints in (10). The ﬁrst-order deriva-


























34From (A3), one observes that
dWd
d` has the same sign as dc

dWd, which is positive.




dWd = 0. Assuming otherwise, then EPA and hence






and bounded away from zero. However, since p0(c) =  1
EPA is bounded,




b (Cp + Cd)

will diverge as ` goes to inﬁnity, and therefore






= 0 in the limit, assuming that
p0(c)2
p(c)p00(c)
is bounded away from zero, which is implied by Assumption 2.
Let c2 be the care level that corresponds with the approximate solution:
c2 solves the ﬁrst order condition 1 + p0(c2)  (` + 1
2(Cp + Cd)) = 0. The
imputed social cost is given by c2+p(c2)(`+ 1
2(Cp+Cd)). We want to show
that this cost is lower than c1 + p(c1)  `. The comparison reduces to
1
2




The left hand side converges to zero, provided Assumption 1. The right hand
side is greater than p0(c2)  ` from the Mean-Value Theorem and the fact
that p00(c) > 0. By the deﬁnition of c2, p0(c2)  ` is equal to `
`+ 1
2(Cp+Cd),
which converges to 1. Thus, the inequality holds when ` is large enough.
Proof of Corollary 7
From (A4), one observes that dc





pends on that of Cd Cp. Consider ﬁrst the case of Cd < Cp. It follows that
dq





b (Cp + Cd)

> 0 from (A3). Comparing













b (Cp+Cd)Cd is positive since q > b





is bounded above by b
2 as q  b. Thus, Wd > 2`
b if Cd < Cp.
35Next, suppose Cd > Cp. Recall that ˜ c is the ﬁrst-best level of care:
1 + p0(˜ c)  ` = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 3). Deﬁne ˜ Wd and ˜ q such that
they implement ˜ c according to (8): ˜ q(1
˜ q
2b) ˜ Wd +Cd = ` and ˜ q = b
2 
CdCp
2 ˜ Wd .
The ﬁrst equation implies that ˜ Wd diverges as ` goes to inﬁnity, and therefore
lim`!1 ˜ q = b
2 from the second equation. We want to show that the derivative
of the social cost evaluated at ˜ Wd is negative, which will imply that the
optimal Wd is greater than ˜ Wd. Substituting the equations that deﬁne ˜ Wd

















The left hand side converges to zero when ˜ q converges to b
2, or, equivalently,
when ` approaches inﬁnity. Provided Assumption 2, the limit of the right
hand side is greater than one, and hence the inequality holds. It follows that
the optimal Wd is greater than ˜ Wd, which is equal to
`Cd
˜ q(1˜ q=2b). The last term
is bounded below by
8(`Cd)
3b since ˜ q is less than b
2 in the current scenario.
Proof of Corollary 8
From the ﬁrst constraint in (10) (q = b
2 
CdCp
2Wd ), one observes that
the settlement rate in equilibrium, 1 
q
b , is greater than 1
2 if and only if
Cp < Cd. Furthermore, Cp < Cd implies that
dq






b (Cp + Cd)

in (A3) is negative since dc

dWd is always
positive. Comparing this inequality with the injurer’s ﬁrst order condition,
























The inequality states that the injurer’s marginal beneﬁt from exerting care
is lower than the marginal beneﬁt for the society. It means that the injurer
should have raised his care level from the society’s point of view.
36Proof of Proposition 9









which is proportional to Wd. Hence, dS
d` is positive as well. Meanwhile, the
changes in Wp and q induced by an increase of ` depend on the slope of the
boundary !i \ !iv, which is determined by the sign of Cd  Cp.
Proof of Example 1
With Cp = Cd, Wp is a constant on the path of !i \ !iv. The constraints




8 Wd + Cd

= 0. The social problem





, which implies (1 + p0(c)  (` +
Cd)) dc

dWd = 0 as the ﬁrst order condition. Comparing this condition with the
previous one, one obtains 3b
8 Wd + Cd = ` + Cd, and hence Wd = 8`
3b.
Assuming p(c) = exp(c), the minimal social cost attained in (10) is
ln(` + Cd) + 1. Meanwhile, the social cost associated with S = Cd is given
by lnCd + `=Cd. The latter cost is greater than the former if `=Cd > 2:146.
Proof of Example 2
First of all, the social cost associated with S = Cd is not aﬀected by
endogeneity of F(q), and thus is given by lnCd + `=Cd.
Assuming (Wp;Wd) 2 !iv, with p(c) = b(c) = ec, the ﬁrst order condi-
tion to the injurer’s problem reduces to 1 + p0(c)  (qWd + Cd) = 0, which
implies c = ln(qWd + Cd). The care level here is higher than the level
when F(q) is exogenous. In other words, given the same decoupling rates,
the injurer will take extra care if being more careful helps to reduce his share
of responsibility. Provided Cp = Cd, one obtains q = b
2 from (10), and






The ﬁrst order condition is (1 + p0(c)  (` + Cd)) dc

dWd = 0. Comparing this
condition to the previous one, one concludes that Wd = `
q = 2`
b , where
37b = exp(c) = 1
`+Cd.
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